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Introduction
In his book In Praise of Forgetting, journalist and social critic David Rieff disputes what he sees
as a normative understanding that, in order to prevent future atrocities, we must remember the
atrocities of the past. He critiques George Santayana’s precept that “he who does not remember
the past is condemned to repeat it,” arguing that, in some cases, memory of past hatreds does not
prevent the recurrence of violence, but encourages it. By highlighting several intractable conflicts
that exemplify a contentious relationship with past violence, including Israel-Palestine and the
Balkans, Rieff advocates for “forgetting” the past—a strategy that he sees in some cases as the only
means of moving forward without the risk of returning to violence. Rieff writes:
[F]ar too often collective historical memory as understood and deployed by communities,
peoples, and nations…has led to war rather than peace, to rancor and ressentiment [sic]…
rather than reconciliation, and to the determination to exact revenge rather than commit to
the hard work of forgiveness.1

Rieff’s text has garnered significant attention in various news media and among people working
in the fields of memory studies and transitional justice. The International Center for Transitional
Justice (ICTJ) even hosted an online debate between Rieff and transitional justice advocate Pablo
de Greiff on the question “Does collective memory impede reconciliation?” Interestingly, Rieff’s
theory has received this attention despite the fact that he offers scant evidence for his arguments
beyond his own presumptions. He engages with little of the vast literature on memory (the book,
in fact, includes no bibliography or citations), especially the plethora of recent work on the subject.2
Instead, he opts to quote poetry and literature alongside only a few major theorists of memory, like
Pierre Nora.3
Rieff claims that the notion that memory of past atrocities like the Holocaust can serve as a
deterrent of future violence is “magical thinking, and of a fairly extreme kind.”4 As proof, he cites
the numerous genocides and atrocities around the world that have occurred since the Holocaust.
Rieff is surely correct that the prevalence of Holocaust memory and education in Germany and
elsewhere did not prevent the Cambodian genocide of the Khmer Rouge or the Rwandan genocide
of 1994 or the ethnic violence that riddled the Balkans in the 1990s. In reality, it is easy to cite
such horrific examples to prove that memory is not preventive, but that is only because it is much
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more difficult to cite the counterexamples, where active remembrance of the past has succeeded
at preventing atrocities. It is impossible to prove a non-event, and Rieff takes full advantage of
that impossibility. But this fact does not mean that memory has no preventive potential. After
all, Germany and the rest of Western Europe have not perpetrated such atrocities since the end
of WWII. When I mentioned this fact to Rieff at a conference in Worcester, Massachusetts,5
Rieff responded by stating that it is very rare that one country perpetrates two genocides, and
therefore it is not proof enough to assert Germany’s non-repetition of atrocities as evidence to the
potential preventive effects of memory. Rieff clearly does not understand that history of genocide
is widely understood as one of the greatest risk factors for future genocides, a point to which I
will return shortly. Moreover, he has conveniently forgotten that Germany did, in fact, perpetrate
another genocide before the Holocaust, when it wiped out a vast majority of the Herero people
and around 50% of the Nama people of present-day Namibia in the first decade of the twentieth
century. Furthermore, it is memory of the violent conflict of WWII and the Holocaust that led
to the formation of the European Union, which, for all its flaws, has undoubtedly succeeded at
preventing its member states from killing each other—not a small feat given the almost unceasing
series of wars and skirmishes that filled the region for centuries prior to the founding of the EU. It
is also hard to believe that Germany’s response to the current Syrian refugee crisis is not in some
way related to a collective memory of the refugees created by Germany during the Third Reich. Of
all the EU countries, Germany has accepted by far the largest number of asylum seekers, pursuing
refuge from atrocities in their home country. Other factors are, of course, also at play. But is it so
far-fetched to think that memory of past violence does not play some contributing role here?
Rieff is indeed correct to say that memory is not always and only preventive. In fact, memory
can be used to encourage violence, rather than deter it. The past has provided ample justification
for enduring social hostilities or outright violence in places like the former Yugoslavia, IsraelPalestine, and the Great Lakes Region of Africa. As I will explain shortly, memory is, by my
definition, the way that the past influences the present and future. Some societies instrumentalize
that past to do wonderful things; others use it to rationalize destruction. But to assert, as Rieff
does, that the answer in these countries where the past is being used to stoke further violence is
to forget is patently absurd. At times, memory is used to prevent. At others, memory is used to
incite. But one thing is certain: memory is. And to expect citizens of post-atrocity societies to forget
a period of recent violence willfully is as much an example of “magical thinking” as Rieff believes
the preventive aspects of memory are. Additionally, it is worth noting that, all too often, those
who most adamantly cry for “forgetting” and “moving forward” are not, themselves, victims, but
those who most benefit personally from large-scale oblivion. In these cases, “forgetting” becomes a
euphemism for outright denial, which, as Gregory Stanton has famously indicated, is itself one of
the constituent stages of genocide.6
In all post-atrocity societies that utilize various strategies to deal with the past and (hopefully)
avert the return of mass violence in the future, these strategies work best when they 1) are motivated
by an intention to prevent violence and create social cohesion; 2) are supported by adequate financial,
social, and political resources; and 3) occur as part of a larger, more comprehensive strategy of
dealing with the past. That is to say: memory can certainly fail when it is mal-intentioned or undersupported, just as it can succeed in contributing to prevention when it is directed toward redress,
acknowledgement, and unity. In other words, although memory of past violence can certainly be
manipulated to justify further violence or social division, it can also be preventive when we work for
it to be. But this leads to a much bigger, more important question--and the focus of this article: How
exactly can we ensure that memory of the past leads to cohesion, rather than division? Or, rather,
how can we remember in order to prevent?
In this article I illustrate the various ways that memory of past genocides and atrocity crimes
can contribute to the prevention of future violent conflict. I begin by offering a brief theoretical
5
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overview of memory, what it means in this context, and the role it plays in post-atrocity societies.
Next, I draw upon the vast research on risk factors for genocide and mass atrocities in order to
provide a framework for thinking about atrocity prevention as mitigating the risk factors associated
with conflict history, social fragmentation, and governance. Finally, I offer an array of examples
of memory initiatives that mitigate one or more of these risk factors, thus reducing the risk of
atrocity. In the end, I argue that, indeed, memory is not always preventive. It can be used to justify
horrific violence. But when a concerted and deliberate effort is made to deal with the past with the
intention of reducing the hostilities that led to conflict, memory can be a powerful force in the fight
to prevent genocide and other atrocities.
Memory vs. History
To understand the preventive capacity of memory, one must first understand what exactly memory
is. Clearly, memory has many different meanings, ranging from the recollection of individual
experience to the reality of “sedimented experience,” through which the past guides our actions
in the world at an often subconscious level.7 When scholars and practitioners discuss memory in
the context of post-atrocity societies, however, they are most often referring to interpretations of
the past that impact the present. It is this form of memory that I address in this article. In his book,
Rieff quotes French historian Jacques Le Goff, who writes that “memory only seeks to rescue the
past in order to serve the present and future.”8 Rieff goes on to write that “exercises in collective
historical remembrance far more closely resemble myth on one side and political propaganda on
the other than they do history.”9 Both Rieff and Le Goff cite this instrumentalization of the past to
prove the weaknesses and dangers of memory. In reality, they are right about what memory is, but
not so right about what memory does.
Indeed, history and memory are not the same. If we think about History (with a capital H)
as what actually happened in the past, then memory is the way that past influences the present
and the future. Or, rather, to evoke Andreas Huyssen, memory is the way the past is present.10 To
complicate this a bit, however, what we call history is very often an aspect of memory. Dimitri
Nikulin writes, “[M]emory is incapable of adequately representing the past and in fact need not do
so, since any act of recollection is an active reconstruction, which is a constructive interpretation
or production of the past.”11 We have all heard the expression, “History is written by the winners.”
In this case, we are not actually speaking of History (with a capital H, meaning what actually
happened), but history (with a lowercase h): the version of the past that is accepted, at the present
moment, at least, as the definitive “truth” of what occurred in the past. This “truth,” however, is
never the whole truth. It is a selective recounting of the past, told from the perspective of those in
power. For every event recounted in a history textbook, there are millions of stories that are not
there…and they are usually the stories of the dispossessed, the vanquished, the oppressed, the
poor, or, in the basest of terms, the “losers” of history. What we call history, then, is very often a
version of memory that has reached a certain level of consensus that places it beyond the boundaries
of dispute. In other words, as Henry Kissinger put it, “History is the memory of states.”12 But if
history can also be a version of memory, then how can we think more deeply about memory?
In State Repression and the Labors of Memory, Argentinean memory scholar Elizabeth Jelin offers
three guiding principles when it comes to thinking about memory.13 First, she emphasizes that
memories are always subjective processes.14 The fact that Jelin does not only stress that memory is
7
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subjective, but that it is a process is essential. It is through the process of memory-making that new
subjectivities are formed. This process can absolutely lead to the formation of hostile or violent
subjectivities, but, when done in a more productive way, can create a conscientious population
that works actively against the recurrence of violence in the future. One aspect of this process is
the implementation of memory initiatives, and it is here where the preventive potential of memory
arises. I return to memory initiatives later in this article.
Second, Jelin writes that memories are always “the object of disputes, conflicts, and struggles.”15
She continues, “This premise involves the need to focus attention on the active and productive role
of participants in these struggles. It is they who generate meanings of the past, framed by the
power relations in which their actions are embedded in the present.”16 I stated before that memory
is, but it is perhaps better to say that memory will be. In post-atrocity societies, it is inevitable that
the violence of the past will be remembered on a grand scale. How that memory develops will
be influenced significantly by the members of that society who advocate for remembrance of the
past—the people at the vanguard of public memory production, who Jennifer Jordan refers to as
memorial entrepreneurs.17 Those memory-makers could be like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,
the group of Argentinean women who continue to demand—peacefully, yet forcefully—the return
of their disappeared children, bringing forth their message of human rights for all as they do so.
But those memory-makers could also be like the leadership of Republika Srpska and Serbia in the
Balkans, who continue to evoke the past to justify antagonistic and often genocidal rhetoric against
Bosniaks in the present.
The fact that memories are disputed and contested is not actually, on its own, a bad thing. In
fact, as I will argue later, a society that allows for an active contestation of the past may even be less
prone to atrocities than those with a specific version of the past that is accepted whole cloth by all.
The problem comes when people, like Rieff, believe that only one version of the past can and should
exist. This assumption is understandable. After all, in post-atrocity societies, we constantly refer
to the phenomenon of collective memory, a concept developed by Maurice Halbwachs to describe
the fact that all individual memories are formed through the social framework of which the
individual is a part.18 But the grammatical singular of collective memory is deceptive. As memory
scholar James E. Young argues, it is better to think in terms of collected memory: “the many discrete
memories that are gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned common meaning.”19
Here, Young refers in different words to the same process of “disputes, conflicts, and struggles”
that Jelin evokes. Collective or cultural memory is formed through the interaction of millions of
individual memories, and often those interactions are not without contention. When this process
is intentionally directed toward the goals of social cohesion or atrocity prevention, however, it can
forge a relationship with the past that brings people together rather than divides them.20
Finally, Jelin writes that, when examining memory, one must recognize that all memory is
specific to the place and moment in which it exists. She writes that “meanings attached to the
past change over time and are part of larger, complex social and political scenarios.”21 Here, we
arrive at the point that Rieff most bristles against: the instrumentalization of memory for political
purposes. Memory certainly always exists within the political sphere, but so, too, does history.
When we recognize the contextuality of memory, however, it allows for two things. First, it helps
us understand that memory is always related to power and forged through relations of power.
This can, at times, be good for some, and bad for others. Either way, the fact that memory is
contextually specific means that it is not permanent—which leads to the second point. This non15
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permanence of memory allows for the possibility of changing the memory narratives that are
being instrumentalized to perpetrate further violence or create social division. It also serves as a
challenge, however, because it means that the process of building a preventive memory culture is a
perpetual one. Social actors must continue to work at this process, as the risk always exists for the
past to be instrumentalized to sow the seeds of strife, rather than of community.
This potential of memory to change is exemplified in Edward S. Casey’s concept of public
memory. Casey develops this term to describe how different memories and memory narratives join
together in the public sphere in order “to guarantee the intimate tie between past and future.”22
According to Casey, public memory is distinct from social memory and collective memory. He
thinks of social memory as memories that are shared by people within the same kinship group,
geographical area, or those dedicated to “a common project.”23 Likewise, he thinks of collective
memory as the phenomenon whereby people who have no association can recall the same event,
despite never having known each other.24 For Casey, collective memory describes the reality that
different groups can relate to the same past event without having to relate to each other; the event
supersedes the people remembering it. Public memory, on the other hand, is when various groups
of people come together in the public sphere through the memory of a certain event. Casey writes
that collective memory “allows for co-remembering without co-reminiscing and for the massive
convergence of those who remember the same thing without knowing each other personally.”25
Collective memory becomes public memory when those diverse groups of people come together in
space, time, and body to remember that past together. Whereas collective memory does not require
that the rememberers be together, public memory demands it.
If we accept Casey’s proposition, then, we could say that all of the instances where Rieff cites
the failure of memory could easily be viewed instead as instances where collective memory failed
to bring people together, to transform into public memory. To take the most obvious example,
everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina who lived through it remembers the horrific violence of the
1990s. To date, that memory of past violence has only led to greater social hostility among the
country’s various ethnic groups. Using Casey’s understanding of memory, however, we could
argue that the reason it has failed to bring healing or to prevent social fragmentation is because not
only has it not transformed into public memory by bringing all sectors of Bosnian society together
to remember the past, but it has also failed at even converting into collective memory. What exists
in Bosnia today is what Casey would call social memory. Each ethnic group has its own version
of the past. Each sees itself as the victim of the others. And there is little place in the public sphere
where these different groups interact or come together to form a common, public memory.
Public memory requires bodies to come together in public space, which is why we must
think of memory not only as something cognitive or psychological, but also as something
embodied and performed.26 It is without doubt the case that memory of the past has been and
is being used in certain places to justify radical intolerance and unspeakable violence. But
for every instance where that is the case, we can find a dozen alternative cases where memory
creates cohesion, positive change, and a less violent society. It is often easier, as Rieff does, to
point to the cases where memory does the former. I now want to turn to instances where memory
does the latter.
Memory and Prevention
To begin a discussion on the preventive capacity of memory, it is essential to acknowledge the white
elephant in the room: proving the preventive capacity of anything is incredibly difficult, especially
for those who are skeptical of prevention discourse from the start. To offer incontrovertible evidence
that an atrocity has been prevented, one would need to prove that an atrocity was undoubtedly set
22
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to take place and, owing to some action, was prevented from taking place. In most cases, however,
it is impossible to prove a non-event. Nevertheless, what we can do is look to the extensive research
we have relating to the risk factors for atrocity and see what memory initiatives have successfully
mitigated one or more of these factors.
The last decade has seen a proliferation of early-warning systems that draw from qualitative
and quantitative data to predict the risk for genocide, state-led mass killing, and/or atrocities. Some
of the most well-known and respected of these systems include the Atrocity Forecasting Project out
of the University of Sydney27, the United Nation’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,28 the
Minorities at Risk Project out of the University of Maryland,29 the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum’s Early Warning Project,30 and Barbara Harff’s model of risk factors for genocide and
politicide.31 Each of these systems utilizes a varying array of risk factors and data to measure risk
for atrocity. In Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide,32 social psychologist
and genocide prevention scholar James Waller performs a thorough analysis of the wide swath of
risk factors identified in these systems to compile a comprehensive list of factors that draws from
the strengths of each. The result is a list of twenty risk factors that cut across many of these earlywarning systems and that fall into four different categories, which I discuss below. I posit that
memory initiatives can be identified as preventive when they succeed at mitigating or eliminating
any of the identifiable risk factors that lead to atrocity. As such, I plan to demonstrate how memory
initiatives in a selection of post-atrocity societies have succeeded at mitigating these risk factors,
and therefore have made the recurrence of violence less likely.
Waller’s risk-assessment model indicates twenty risk factors for atrocity that spread across four
different categories: governance, conflict history, economic conditions, and social fragmentation.
Each of these categories contains five specific risk factors that fall within its purview. For the
purposes of this article, I will focus on the role that memory initiatives have played and can play
in mitigating the risk factors associated with three of these categories: conflict history, governance,
and social fragmentation. I take my definition of memory initiative from Impunity Watch’s Policy
Brief on “Guiding Principles of Memorialization,” which defines a memory initiative as
any activity that aims to commemorate or enhance understanding of a conflictive past,
including—but not limited to—the erection and maintenance of memorials and monuments,
the operation of museums and exhibits, traditional ceremonies and rituals, musical and
theatrical performances on relevant topics, the running of educational, awareness-raising,
dialogue and remembrance programs, the teaching of history, and the gathering and
preservation of information.33

This definition offered by the policy brief demonstrates the vast gamut of memory initiatives that
exist. In the remainder of this article, I focus on an array of memory initiatives to evaluate their
capacity to mitigate risk factors for atrocity. By offering specific examples of memory spaces and
practices in diverse post-atrocity societies, I demonstrate how memory initiatives can and have
mitigated the risk factors associated with conflict history, social fragmentation, and governance.
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Conflict History
Perhaps the primary risk factor that memory initiatives as a whole mitigate are those associated
with conflict history. Across numerous risk assessment models, including Waller’s, one of the
clearest risk factors for atrocity is the existence of a past atrocity.34 The reasons why conflict history
presents such a dangerous risk factor for atrocity is in dispute. Scott Straus highlights several
potential reasons: perhaps it is because the former implementation of systematic discrimination
and mass killing conditions leaders to see it as a viable option, or perhaps it has more to do with
a combination of past violence and impunity in its aftermath, signaling to perpetrators that such
actions will not result in punishment.35 I tend to lean toward the argument that past systematic
discrimination resulting in mass killing demonstrates the potential by a society at large to write
off certain groups as outside the realm of moral responsibility—a point to which I will return.
Whatever the reason, the risk factors associated with prior genocides or politicides are clear.
Unfortunately, this risk factor is one that cannot ever be completely eliminated; if a society
experienced a genocide, nothing can make that genocide go away. In this case, however, there
are ways of mitigating the power of this risk factor. Waller writes, “[C]onflict history in a state or
region is a nonmodifiable risk factor for the onset of future genocide—if it happened, it cannot be
unhappened. What can be modified, however, are the ways in which that history is remembered,
taught, processed, and understood.”36 In other words, conflict history presents varying degrees of
risk based on the way it manifests in public memory—the way it functions in contemporary discourse
and practice.
For this reason, memory is just one aspect of a much bigger process that every post-atrocity
society must face in the aftermath of large-scale, systematic violence. A single word emerged in
post-WWII Germany to describe this process: Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which literally means,
“coming to terms with the past.” Today, however, memory is considered a process that is both a
part of and exceeds the framework of transitional justice. Transitional justice (TJ) is the term that has
emerged to describe the ways a society deals with the human rights abuses of its past. Even though
its name may imply that it involves only judicial means of dealing with the past (e.g. the criminal
prosecution of perpetrators), TJ refers both to the juridical and non-juridical means by which a
society addresses past atrocities and systematic human rights violations. As TJ has expanded as
a field over the past several decades, certain keywords or themes have become associated with
its processes. Each of these words extends beyond the political and the pragmatic. Indeed, each
has a kind of moral or ethical value attached to it, as well. These words inevitably come up in the
aftermath of mass atrocity, and they highlight what many people feel is at stake when it comes
to dealing with the past. They are words like truth, justice, and reconciliation. They also include
memory.
Yet, the notion of memory and public memory formation also exceeds the framework of TJ—a
rubric that focuses most especially on the role the state plays in dealing with the past.37 Indeed,
when it comes to memory, the state is not the only, or even the most important, actor. The idea of
remembering the past in order to honor those who were lost and to guarantee the non-recurrence of
violence, however, is central to TJ. TJ is traditionally framed as a backward-looking process, which
seeks to address past harms and to initiate reforms based on what occurred in the past. There is
a growing literature, however, that depicts TJ equally as a forward-looking process that, through
mechanisms like truth commissions, criminal prosecutions, institutional reform, and various
acts of reparations, creates a society that is more equipped to prevent future violence through an

34
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engagement with the past in what Waller refers to as downstream prevention.38 Broadly speaking,
then, TJ is a process to mitigate the risk factors of conflict history.
One category of memory initiative that both fits within and exceeds this framework of TJ is
the creation of sites of memory and memorials. This vast category of memory initiatives includes,
among other things, former sites of atrocity, memorials, monuments, and memory museums.
Memorials and monuments can be an aspect of transitional justice in a number of ways. For one,
they can serve as a form of symbolic reparations to victims of violence and oppression. By creating
official sites of memory that honor those who suffered or died during periods of extreme violence,
the state can acknowledge and legitimize that suffering. In this way, memorials can provide a sense
of justice, giving victims a feeling that their suffering is recognized. Memorials can also be a site for
truth-telling, where the story of what happened in the past can be transmitted to new generations.
Sites of memory can be potential sites of reconciliation, in that they can provide a space for groups
to come together around shared or even contested narratives of the past.
Political scientist Louis Bickford argues, however, that memorials do not only serve as a
component of transitional justice by offering redress for past violations of human rights. Thoughtfully
constructed sites of memory also play a role in preventing future violence by reducing some of
the risk factors presented by conflict history.39 According to the authors of Memorialization and
Democracy: State Policy and Civic Action, a report from the 2007 conference held in Santiago, Chile,
which brought together memory scholars and practitioners from around the world to discuss the
relationship between spaces of memory and democracy:
Memorials whose goal is to prevent the repetition of past abuses will ask us not only to
remember the victims, but to look inward and think critically about our history and
what forces within society or ourselves unleashed the demons of war, racism, or political
oppression. If deliberately designed as open forums, they also have the potential to be part
of broader democratic reconstruction by fostering dialogue that helps citizens come to terms
with the past and understand its relation to the present and future. Memorials conceived of
as more than sacred space or symbolic reparations can thus form an integral part of the longterm objectives of transitional justice.40

When developed within the framework of a conscientious strategy to relate the past to the present
and future, memory sites can mitigate the risk factors associated with conflict history by framing
the past as not fully past and by creating spaces for active engagement with that history.
One clear risk factor that sites of memory can serve to mitigate is what Waller calls the presence
of past cultural trauma. Just as an individual who has experienced a traumatic event can be haunted
by that event in a way that impedes his or her ability to function positively in the present, societies
that have experienced a traumatic past are often impeded by the ghosts of that past violence.
Sites of memory can provide a venue for what Dominick LaCapra calls the “working through” of
this past cultural trauma.41 According to LaCapra, who elaborates upon the concept of Sigmund
Freud, trauma must be “worked through” productively in order to prevent it from “acting out,”
that is, from constantly re-manifesting as a violent, damaging force.42 LaCapra writes, “[Working
through] means coming to terms with the trauma, including its details, and critically engaging the
tendency to act out the past and even to recognize why it may be necessary and even in certain
38
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respects desirable or at least compelling.”43 Although this model, as originally conceived, deals
primarily with individual trauma, Waller’s risk assessment model demonstrates how this metaphor
also applies on the societal level. If a society that has experienced past cultural trauma does not
proactively work through that history, it remains a risk factor for the re-emergence of violence—
that is, the “acting out” of that cultural trauma through renewed acts of physical destruction.
Sites of memory have a real role to play in the working through of cultural trauma, and
therefore in the mitigation of atrocity risk. They can do this in a number of ways. First, sites of
memory can ensure that the truth about the past is widely known and understood, a first step in
working through past trauma. Memorial museums are one prevalent and effective type of memory
site whose primary goal is to inform the public about the facts of what actually occurred. The
Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile, is one example of such a museum.
Inaugurated in 2010, this museum serves both as a memorial to the victims of oppression under
Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973-90), and as a museum providing a comprehensive
historical overview of the events that occurred during this period of violence, as well as those that
preceded and followed it. According to the Museum’s website:
The Museum of Memory and Human Rights is a space designed to give visibility to the
human rights violations committed by the Chilean State between 1973 and 1990, to dignify
the victims and their families, and to stimulate reflection and debate on the importance of
respect and tolerance, so that these acts will never again be repeated.44

This mission statement demonstrates how the museum serves a dual purpose. By informing visitors
about what exactly occurred during the period of violence, it is simultaneously encouraging a
working through by, in their words, “[stimulating] reflection and debate on the importance of
respect and tolerance.”45 In other words, the museum serves to bridge the gap between the past and
present, asking what lessons can be learned from the past to ensure that it does not repeat itself.
Sites of memory can also aid in the working through of past trauma by literally transforming
former sites of death into sites of life and community. Some of the most powerful sites of memory
are former sites of atrocity that have been converted into memory spaces, for examples, the former
concentration camps of Europe and the former detention and torture centers of Latin America.
When these sites of death become active and vibrant sites of memory, the spaces that once
worked to produce death are transformed into spaces that both educate visitors about the past
and hopefully produce within them a personal commitment to preventing the recurrence of such
violence. Examples abound of such creative uses of memory space.
The District Six Museum in Cape Town, South Africa, is located within the bounds of the
District Six National Heritage Site, which saw the forced displacement of tens of thousands
of mostly black South Africans during Apartheid. Today, the District Six Museum educates
visitors about the history of Apartheid, using the story of District Six to tell the broader story
of this oppressive regime as a whole. It is not only a place of history, however. The directors of
the District Six Museum have created an array of programs that ensure the lessons of Apartheid
are not solely those of a distant past; rather, the threat of race-based oppression is ever-present
and must be actively resisted. Through oral history projects, South African youth are trained in
oral history methodologies so that they record the stories of the generations that lived through
Apartheid. Projects like this help to ensure the preservation of memory related to this past. The
museum also hosts a number of projects that more directly connect the history of Apartheid with
current issues of racism and human rights abuses. The Anti-Racism and Human Rights Project, coorganized with the British Council in 2006/2007, offered training to youth on issues of racism and
human rights, before helping the young participants to develop and implement community-based
projects addressing these issues in their own communities. Likewise, the 2006 Zenit Exchange
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Programme with the Malmö Museum of Sweden organized international exchanges for students
to “[investigate] global issues of poverty, unfair trade, gender, racism, human rights, health and
welfare.”46 Through programs like these, the memory workers of the District Six Museum connect
“then” with “now”, demonstrating that learning about past violence can also lead to action and
social transformation in the present. The projects created by these youth, then, serve to mitigate
in some way another risk factor of atrocity: records of serious violations of international human rights
and laws.47 According to the UN’s Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes, “Societies that have
a history of violence and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
or atrocity crimes, or where these are currently taking place, can be more prone to further atrocity
crimes.”48 The atrocity crimes of Apartheid are an historical fact that cannot be altered. The projects
initiated by the participants in these programs, however, use the lessons of Apartheid to address
current violations of human rights or the unequal access to goods and services; in the process, they
curtail the effects of this risk factor, thus making future atrocity crimes less likely.
These examples from the District Six Museum illustrate how sites of memory on their own can
do very little to mitigate the risks for atrocity. Rather, it is how these sites are used that determines
their preventive potential. One of the productive ways to ensure that a memorial space remains
alive and active—a space that pushes memory of the past into the everyday so that it can be
preventive, rather than a space that sequesters the past away, keeping the discomforts of prior
violence out of sight and mind—is to make sure these sites of memory themselves become venues
for other memory initiatives.49 This idea is supported by Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter when
they call for a move away from “old memorial and museum traditions of creating static spaces.”
They continue, quoting Liz Ševčenko, “The goal is to make or preserve places for ‘performances
of democracy, not static representation of national identity.’”50 Spaces of memory can be more
successfully preventive when they are also spaces for civil society activism, for the coming together
of dissenting groups in historical dialogue, for the transmission of memory to future generations,
and for the utilization of the arts to keep these spaces full of life, rather than only full of past
death. The one point I hope to emphasize here is that memorial spaces on their own are completely
insufficient. The spaces must be activated and filled with the bodies of rememberers, who must in
turn be inspired and activated by the space to go forth and do the difficult, yet necessary work of
prevention. In other words, the preventive capacity of memory initiatives is not only related to how
they address the risk factors related to conflict history, but also how they bring people together in
a way that addresses a second category of risk factors for atrocities: social fragmentation.
Social Fragmentation
Another capacity of memory initiatives for the prevention of atrocity involves the mitigation of
risks associated with what Waller refers to as social fragmentation. During periods of genocide
and mass atrocity, two processes that are common across almost all cases are the fragmentation
and atomization of civil society.51 Fragmentation involves the breaking down of societies into
specific identity groups so that these groups eventually cease to interact or associate with each
other. During the Holocaust, for instance, Jews and other “undesirable” social groups were
isolated from the larger German society. In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis—two groups that had lived
together in relative harmony for many decades before the 1960s—reached levels of fragmentation
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that allowed for the attempted destruction of one of these groups. In turn, atomization refers to
the breaking down of even these separate identity groups into sole individuals who feel so alone
and so threatened by perpetrator regimes that they fear even coming together with other victims
to organize against the structures working against them. Hannah Arendt points out that this
atomization is particularly indicative of totalitarian regimes, like the Soviet Union.52 Argentinean
political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell articulates how this same type of atomization was present
in the military dictatorships of Latin America.53 When civil society is not only fragmented, but also
atomized, it becomes incredibly difficult to prevent the rise of genocidal or atrocity regimes or
resist their exercise of power once they have already taken control.
A fragmented and atomized civil society is a notable risk factor for atrocity. Waller writes,
“Where social cohesion can unite a people and strengthen a society, social fragmentation splinters
a people, reduces the resiliency of a society, and places it at increased risk for violent or genocidal
conflict.”54 Likewise, a society within which different identity groups interact and are able to
organize collectively to express their desires and exercise their rights is less likely to fall victim
to genocide or atrocity. According to the UN Framework for Analysis, societies become more
resilient and less likely to commit atrocities by “supporting a strong and diverse civil society and
a pluralistic media.”55 Sites of memory can play an integral role in undoing the fragmentation of
groups and encouraging social cohesion around shared memories of the past.
If one of the principal goals of perpetrator regimes is to fragment and isolate civil society
groups, oftentimes positioning them against each other, sites of memory can be sites where some of
these fragmented groups can both literally and figuratively come together again. Sites of memory
provide physical spaces within which those affected and torn apart by that violence can unite again,
leading to new levels of social cohesion, and thus mitigating some of the risk factors associated with
social fragmentation. In other words, sites of memory can be key components in the production of
Casey’s concept of public memory: memory produced through the coming together of individuals
in the public sphere in order to remember or confront the past collectively.
During Argentina’s last military dictatorship (1976-83), most public interaction was
criminalized. Labor unions and political parties were declared illegal, and even stopping on the
street to speak with someone was suspect. There was little to no room in the public sphere for
individuals to come together and resist the violent regime. When the dictatorship fell, the public
sphere was reopened, and Argentina began a vigorous, though brief, campaign of what today we
would call transitional justice, including the creation of the world’s first truth commission56 and the
prosecution of the architects of the dictatorship. Nonetheless, the threat of another military coup
soon overwhelmed these efforts, and for around two decades the country experienced a culture of
impunity where the crimes of the past went unpunished and largely unacknowledged. This shifted
in the early 2000s, however, with the election of Nestor Kirchner as president. Kirchner and his
government reopened the books on the past and began again the work of dealing with its legacy.
One of the key moments in this turning back to the past came on the 28th anniversary of
the military coup, 24 March 2004, when Kirchner visited the Escuela Superior Mecánica de la
Armada (ESMA), the dictatorship’s largest former detention and torture center, where some 5000
Argentineans were tortured and killed. Until that day, the site was still under military control.
In a gesture still remembered and discussed today, Kirchner had a soldier remove from the wall
the paintings of the leaders of the dictatorship, before opening the gates of ESMA to the public,
declaring it an official site of memory.57 Today, ESMA hosts the official space of memory in the
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building where these victims were tortured and imprisoned. The complex also includes a cultural
center that features art exhibitions, theatrical performances, concerts, conferences, a bookstore, and
a café. Furthermore, the majority of the other buildings on the premises were given to civil society
organizations working toward the promotion of memory and human rights. In other words, this
site of violence and death has now been transformed into a space of life. Argentineans visit the space
every day, not only to remember the violent past, but also to work actively toward the prevention
of such violence in the future. By including cultural events and a café in the space, ESMA has
also become a space of community. During the period of the dictatorship, Argentinean society
was completely fragmented and atomized by the violent regime. Today, the site that represented
the pinnacle of this violence is a site for bringing together the people who were once its victims,
undoing some risk factors associated with social fragmentation in the process.58
The example of ESMA demonstrates how sites of memory can literally bring together
fragmented groups, thus mitigating some of the risk factors associated with fragmentation. Sites
of memory can also mitigate the risk factors of social fragmentation in more figurative ways. One
of the principal reasons that social fragmentation is a risk for genocide and atrocity is because it
contributes to excluding groups from what genocide scholar Helen Fein calls the moral universe
or universe of moral obligation of the potential perpetrator.59 When a certain social group exists
outside the universe of moral obligation of other groups, it can experience a form of social death
that can precede physical killing.60 Waller writes, “Genocide inflicts a social death which makes
the victims’ lives, and their termination, meaningless.”61 Part of the process of mitigating the risk
factors associated with social fragmentation, then, involves making the lives of fragmented groups
meaningful to each other again, ensuring that all social groups exist within each other’s universe
of moral obligation. This difficult task involves the generation of empathy, and memory initiatives
have a role to play in this process, as well.
One key form of memory initiative connected to undoing social fragmentation and generating
empathy between groups is historical dialogue programs. Elazar Barkan, perhaps the preeminent
scholar in this field of historical dialogue, writes:
Conflict between groups is often transgenerational, and the historical animosity remains if it
is not addressed. Fear and desire for revenge often linger and inform the policies of the groups
involved, and are prone to be awakened by nationalists and fundamentalists as carriers of
xenophobia. Historical dialogue aims to diffuse such hatred by engaging government and
civil society in conversations about history and introducing empathy and even sympathy
toward the other. Historical dialogue takes place directly and explicitly when two sides are
engaged in joint historical writing, such as through a bilateral commission […], joint civil
society projects, or other ways of producing historical knowledge.62

Particularly in cases of intractable conflict—for example, Israel Palestine or the Balkans—opposing
groups rarely interact with each other, much less attempt to understand the other’s point of
view. As such, the groups remain fragmented, outside the other’s realm of moral obligation.
Historical dialogue programs are a specific type of memory initiative that bring together
representatives from these opposing groups to begin a dialogue. Importantly, the end goal of this
dialogue is not necessarily consensus or total agreement on what occurred in the past and who
is responsible. Rather, historical dialogue can be preventive primarily by bringing fragmented
groups who never interact into the same space and secondarily by reaching a space of mutual
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respect and understanding in which opposing positions can exist in parallel without resulting in
violent conflict.
Ensuring free and open debate about the past is not always easy, especially when certain
groups uphold a version of the past that rationalizes the violence that occurred. But if those voices
are silenced completely or left out of the public sphere, societies risk polarizing these groups,
encouraging factionalisms that can become quite dangerous and lead to the perpetration of
further atrocities.63 Genocide scholar Scott Straus frames this notion a different way. He argues
that genocides and other forms of mass categorical violence require a strong founding narrative, or
a “preexisting ideological framework,” which justifies or legitimates violence toward a specific
group identity.64 Straus stresses, however, that these violent founding narratives can and have been
mitigated in a number of cases by strong counternarratives, which refute the ideological bases for
violence that the founding narratives provide. Obviously, the development of counternarratives
alongside other narratives requires an open and active public sphere, where different narratives
can exist and discursively shape each other. Surely there is some risk involved in this openness,
because it can allow public space for the airing of violent ideologies. This is also not to say that
placing a modicum of restriction on the freedoms of speech and expression is wrong. I argue,
however, that allowing public space for the expression of all viewpoints, including potentially
dangerous ones, can be essential in creating a sense of urgency around the sorts of narratives or
counternarratives that stress pluralism, inclusion, and non-violent conflict resolution. Historical
dialogue is ultimately about critically examining the founding narratives that may lead to atrocity,
while at the same time constructing or reinforcing counternarratives that may potentially prevent
it.
Programs for historical dialogue can take a number of forms, but I will highlight two
examples here to provide some level of illustration. Today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is still
no consensus among the major ethnic groups regarding the violence that ripped the country
apart in the 1990s. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, and Croats all have their own
versions of the past, and each sees itself as the victim of the other groups. On top of this, the
country is incredibly segregated, so most people do not live, work, learn, or interact with anyone
aside from those in their own ethnic group. Each group has its own system of education, and
while children all have similar math and science curricula, they each learn a completely different
version of history.
In the face of this reality, the Center for Peacebuilding in Sanski Most, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is
working, in their words, “to rebuild trust and foster reconciliation among the people of Bosnia—
Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and others.”65 The Center has developed a number of programs that bring
together members from the different ethnic and religious groups of the country to talk openly and
honestly about their own perceptions of the past and of the others. Among the various programs of
the Center are their Peace Camps—weeklong gatherings of youth from all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
ethnic groups. For many of the youth who participate in the Peace Camps, it is their first time
interacting in a meaningful way with members of the other ethnic groups. They are encouraged to
speak about topics that may be otherwise taboo, in an effort to build trust and understanding about
the others’ perceptions and feelings about the past and the present. Participants are also trained
in nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, and those who continue the training go on to lead
similar dialogues with primary school children when they return home, giving the Peace Camps a
multiplier effect. To date, hundreds of Bosnian youth from all ethnic groups have participated in
the Peace Camps, and many of them maintain relationships both with the Center and their fellow
participants after the Peace Camps are complete.
Another form of historical dialogue occurs through the implementation of historical commissions
(HCs), which usually involve historians themselves coming together to debate opposing views of
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the past and reach some level of agreement on how either the past or these disagreements should
be presented. This process of historical debate and the construction of some form of “sanctioned”
memory can serve to mitigate conflict between groups. Alexander Karn writes, “One interesting
feature of the HCs is their ability to produce and circulate mediating narratives in societies where
historical injustices have not been fully acknowledged. ‘Mediating’ refers to the recontextualization
of past events to ensure they are presented in a nuanced, explanatory framework, rather than in
a caustic, accusatory one.”66 In other words, HCs are not necessarily about reaching consensus
over the past, but rather finding a way of contextualizing different views of the past so that their
potential to ignite violent conflict is reduced.
One such example comes from the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME), which
in the early 2000s worked with a group of Palestinian and Israeli history teachers to develop a
joint history textbook for school children. The result of the process was a textbook that included
the Israeli and Palestinian narratives relating to conflict in parallel, translated into both Hebrew
and Arabic. According to the organizers of the project, “This would mean that each student would
learn not only his/her own narrative, but also the narrative of the other, as a first step toward
acknowledging and respecting the other.”67 In the early stages of development the authors also left
a blank space in between the two narratives so that both students and their teachers could include
their own perspectives. The long-term effects of this project are yet unclear as the final version
of the textbook was only published in 2012,68 but some of the teachers involved in the project’s
creation did provide some anecdotal evidence of the early test copies of the text. For example, one
Palestinian teacher used the texts in his classroom and asked the students to write their responses:
“Some of them expressed an interest in meeting Israeli pupils in order to discuss these texts
together. Others wanted to know more about this date or that person, mentioned briefly in the
texts. There were reports of students who immediately started to deconstruct the other’s narrative.
In general, the two narratives evoked a surprise that created interest and curiosity.”69 Clearly, this
shared textbook project has not brought an end to conflict in Israel/Palestine. In fact, both the
example from Bosnia and this example demonstrate how difficult it is to mitigate the risk factors of
atrocity when governmental actors cease to curtail rhetoric that only exacerbates division. But they
also exemplify the hope of generating a transformation in the grassroots that could eventually have
some impact on state discourse, as well. This is not to say, however, that memory initiatives cannot
have an impact in mitigating risk factors for atrocity associated with the third and final category
we will examine: governance.
Governance
Under the category of governance, Waller outlines five risk factors for atrocity: The first relates
to regime type. Current research shows that atrocities are far more likely to occur under autocratic
governments than democratic governments. Second, states that suffer from a legitimacy deficit—
that is, states that are not perceived as legitimate by their own citizens—are more at risk for
atrocity than those in which the government has the support of its people. Third, states with strong
structures for providing basic services, upholding the law, and responding to the needs of the
population are less at risk for atrocity than those societies with weak state structures. Fourth, states
that exemplify or encourage identity-based polar factionalism, where only certain identity groups are
represented in the halls of government, are more at risk for atrocity. Finally, states that implement
systematic acts of discrimination against certain groups are at higher risk for atrocity. Examples of
such discrimination include “removal of civil liberties, restricting educational access, arbitrary
detention or imprisonment, torture as state policy, large-scale illegal round-ups of civilians, the
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revocation of the right to citizenship, expropriation or destruction of property (including cultural,
religious and sacred sites).”70
Ultimately, it may seem unlikely that memory initiatives can have a real impact on risk factors
associated with governance, particularly those related to regime type, given that autocratic regimes
are unlikely even to allow public memory initiatives that counter the discourse of the regime. Indeed,
it is rare that a memory initiative can transform an autocratic government to a democratic one. That
said, memory initiatives have often had an impact on bringing state-led impunity to an end, and
therefore strengthening the rule of law, a necessary reality in democratic societies. One example of
this comes from Argentina, which experienced nearly two decades of impunity for perpetrators of
human rights violations during the military dictatorship of 1976-83. In the midst of this period in
the mid-1990s, an activist group known as H.I.J.O.S. (the Spanish acronym for Sons and Daughters
for Identity and Justice, against Forgetting and Silence) was formed by the sons and daughters of
those who had been disappeared by the military juntas during the dictatorship. Through a creative
form of street activism known as the escrache, H.I.J.O.S. pointed out the perpetrators living free
and unpunished across the country and called on that perpetrator’s neighbors to “sentence” them
by ostracizing them socially. H.I.J.O.S. constantly evoked the crimes of the past, as well as the
activism of their disappeared parents, to transform the state of impunity to one of memory and
justice. Their slogan, “If there is no justice, there will be escrache” (“Si no hay justicia, hay escrache”)
promised that they would continue their activism until the government dismantled the system of
impunity and reinstated the rule of law, whereby all perpetrators would be tried for their crimes.
H.I.J.O.S. continued making escraches until 2005, when the government reinstated trials against
the perpetrators. The role played by civil society and human rights organizations like H.I.J.O.S.
was central to the transformation of Argentinean society from a culture of impunity to one of
justice. According to Andrea Gualde, former National Director of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat
of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice in Argentina, “It would be impossible to approach a
study of our country’s recent history without stating the central role played by the human rights
movement in the political and social configuration of contemporary Argentina.”71
Memory initiatives also have a real role to play in addressing deficits in the legitimacy of the
state. One strong example of this comes from Indonesia. For decades, the Indonesian government
refused to acknowledge the genocidal violence perpetrated by state and paramilitary actors in the
1960s against so-called “communist subversives.” Annie E. Pohlman writes:
Within broader understandings of restorative justice after the end of authoritarianism,
Indonesia stands out as an example of how new regimes sacrifice any attempt at restoration
or justice for the short-term goals of securing elite support for democratization. This support,
however, has come at a high price: a low-quality democracy, the capture of the newly built
democratic institutions by oligarchic elites, and now swift back stepping on hard-won
reforms to ensure human rights.72

In other words, the way that the Indonesian state had (not) dealt with the past resulted in the
exacerbation of a number of risk factors: 1) a state legitimacy deficit, 2) a series of weak state
structures, and 3) the risk factors associated with state-led discrimination, given that the government
was controlled by oligarchs that prevented non-elites from assuming any form of power. In light
of these realities, a coalition of forty-seven grassroots organizations declared 2013 the Year of Truth
in Indonesia. Participating NGOs spent the year gathering a bevy of video testimonies, which were
professionally edited and distributed using YouTube and an array of social media strategies. The
Year of Truth culminated in November 2013 with a national forum called “Hearing Testimony,” in
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which survivors testified to the many manifestations of violence during and in the aftermath of the
massacres of the 1960s.73 The following year, Joko Widodo became the first democratically elected
president who was not a member of the traditional ruling elites. Among his campaign promises
was to deal more actively with Indonesia’s history of abuses, and he began to fulfill this promise
in 2016, first by initiating a National Symposium on the massacres of the 1960s, and then by calling
for an investigation of the mass graves relating to this period.74 Although these two measures
represent only the beginning of a process that will hopefully continue, they certainly demonstrate
how the civil society memory initiatives of the Year of Truth both marked and contributed to a sea
change in the way the Indonesian state would deal with its past. The election of Widodo marked an
opening of the political space to non-elites, thus mitigating some of the risk factors related to stateled discrimination, and Widodo’s subsequent acknowledgements of the violence of the 1960s—a
break from half a century of total silence on the part of the state—has begun the work of repairing
the state legitimacy deficit that also presents a risk for future atrocities.
Although it may be true that the most visible and widely discussed aspects of dealing with
the past—from truth commissions to criminal prosecution to reparations to institutional reform—
require the participation of governmental actors, the fact remains that most of these processes
initiate through a movement from the grassroots that begins long before the state opts to assume
responsibility for these projects.75 Through memory initiatives like those outlined above, nongovernmental actors can have a real role in transforming the way the state functions and responds
to the past. In the meantime, they are reducing a number of risk factors for atrocity associated with
governance by invigorating a public sphere within which their voices are heard and their calls for
truth, memory, and justice are answered.
Conclusion
Rieff is not wrong that memory of the past can be difficult and its instrumentalization can, in some
cases, provoke conflict. All of the examples he offers to prove his point, however, are cases where
memory is being used to isolate, rather than to bring people together. The atomizing effects of
genocidal violence are still in play. There is another potential for memory in these places, however,
and that potential does not exist in advocating for memory’s elimination (as if that were even
possible). Rather, the discomforts and the pain of the past, which are often felt to varying degrees
on all sides of the social equation, could provide a starting point for a new conversation—one that
leads to new levels of understanding and empathy. It is not an easy process, nor is it a quick one.
But here the pliability of memory is actually its greatest asset. The fact that memory narratives can
change means that damaging views of the past, which serve to fragment societies, rather than bring
them together, can be rewritten. With a great deal of effort, new narratives can be generated…
narratives that counter the dangerous incitements of the old narratives and that, as they gain
traction, provide a much greater potential of preventing the return of old hostilities in the future.
These new narratives, however, will not emerge spontaneously. They require the dedication and
intention of memory workers—both at the state and grassroots levels—who endeavor to implement
memory initiatives meant not to divide, but to unite.
In this article I have focused on an array of memory initiatives, offering only a handful of
examples of the myriad ways these practices have manifested and how they have mitigated,
at least partially, some of the risk factors for atrocity associated with conflict history, social
fragmentation, and governance. Although these practices are all quite different, and while the
kinds of memory initiatives that emerge from within a post-atrocity society are certainly always
specific to the cultural and historical contexts of the society itself, all of the practices I highlight
have one important thing in common—and it is, for me, the essential quality that makes them
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potentially preventive. All of these practices center on the coming together of physical bodies in
public space in one way or other. It is easy to think about memory as something that happens only
in the mind of the individual. In reality, memory is a force that is embodied and that affects the
ways our bodies interact with others. When memory isolates or atomizes bodies, it has little chance
at being preventive. On the other hand, when it draws people together in the public sphere—even
when it leads to nonviolent disputes and contentious debates—memory has a much greater chance
of preventing genocidal violence. Of course, memory alone is not enough. Prevention requires
an effort from all levels of society: state to civil society, local to global, young to old. To be sure,
however, memory can be a factor in prevention. As I said earlier, whether we want it or not, memory
will be. How we approach memory is the key to determining whether it will be destructive or will be
preventive.
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